Meadian reflections on the existential ambivalence of human selfhood by Susen, Simon
 
 
Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the 
research output of Birkbeck College 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk 
 
 
Susen, S. 
Meadian Reflections on the Existential Ambivalence of 
Human Selfhood 
Studies in Social and Political Thought 17, (2010), 
pp.62-81 
 
 
This is an exact copy of an article published in Studies in Social and Political 
Thought (ISSN 1467-2219) made available here with kind permission of: © 
2010 University of Sussex, Centre for Social and Political Thought.  All rights 
reserved.  
 
All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual 
property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should 
comply with the relevant law. 
 
Citation for this version: 
 
Susen, S. 
Meadian Reflections on the Existential Ambivalence of Human Selfhood 
London: Birkbeck ePrints. Available at: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/1278 
 
Citation for publisher’s version: 
 
Susen, S. 
Meadian Reflections on the Existential Ambivalence of Human Selfhood 
Studies in Social and Political Thought 17, (2010), pp.62-81 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk 
Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk 
Birkbeck ePrints 
Meadian Reflections on the Existential
Ambivalence of Human Selfhood
by Simon Susen
Introduction
This paper examines the existential ambivalence of human selfhood by
drawing upon George Herbert Mead’s influential distinction between the ‘I’
and the ‘me’.  The centrality of this distinction to Mead’s analysis of the self
is reflected not only in the numerous references to these two pivotal
categories in Mead’s writings1 but also in the fact that it is widely recognised
as one of Mead’s core conceptual tools in the literature on symbolic
interactionism2.  Although the distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ has
been extensively discussed in the literature and studied from different
theoretical angles, neither advocates nor critics of Mead’s symbolic
interactionism have provided a comprehensive and systematic account of
the variety of meanings which the notions of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ are given in
Mead’s analysis of the self.  The standard interpretation of the distinction
between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ identifies the former with the idiosyncratic and
innovative aspects of the self, whilst associating the latter with the social and
conservative components of the self.3 Without seeking to demonstrate that
this view is mistaken, this paper offers a detailed analysis of the multifaceted
theoretical and practical implications of Mead’s distinction between the ‘I’
and the ‘me’.  As we shall see, the conceptual complexity of Mead’s analytical
separation between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ is indicative of the existential
ambivalence of the human self, that is, of the coexistence of various opposing
forces which pervade every ordinary subject’s relation to the world.
Given that Mead conceives of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ as two constitutive
components of the self, it is important to clarify the meaning of the notion
of the self within the Meadian framework of social analysis.  Hence, before
embarking upon the examination of Mead’s central distinction between the
‘I’ and the ‘me’, it is essential to consider three key presuppositions that
underlie Mead’s theory of the self.
First, according to Mead, the self is a defining feature of human beings.  In
other words, the self represents a human specificity.4 To assume that the self
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is a feature of human beings – and of human beings alone – means to suggest
that human beings are the only entities capable of developing a notion of
personhood.  In fact, what raises us out of nature is our ‘self-based’ nature:
human beings have a deep-seated need to construct their own world beyond
the natural world because their existence is permeated by the existence of
selfhood.  People are different from animals in that they have both the
capacity and the need to create a sense of who they are as individuals.  The
existence of selfhood grants every ordinary subject the privilege of being
both a member of society and a member of humanity.
Second, according to Mead, the self is always and unavoidably social.  Put
differently, the self is the subjectively developed expression of human
sociality.5 To recognise that the self is an indispensable part of human society
– and of human society alone – means to acknowledge that human societies
are the only collective entities capable of producing subjects with a sense of
personhood.  Indeed, what distinguishes the social world from the natural
world is the ‘self-based’ constitution of the former as opposed to the ‘self-
less’ constitution of the latter: human societies have an inherent need to
create subjects capable of acquiring a sense of selfhood, for the emergence
of human societies is inconceivable without the development of human
personalities.  The human world is different from the physical world in that
it has both the capacity and the necessity to generate social selves whose
interconnectedness constitutes the ontological cornerstone of human
coexistence.
Third, according to Mead, the self is linguistically structured.  Hence, the
self is both the creator and the carrier of human linguisticality.6 To accept that
the self is at the same time a producer and a product of a linguistically
mediated relation to the world means to understand that language is an
empowering symbolic vehicle which allows for the possibility of reflectively
guided interaction between social actors.  To be sure, what elevates the
symbolic world of human beings from the symbolic world of animals is the
linguistic nature of the human universe: human subjects have a deep-rooted
need to convert the givenness of their immersion in the world into the
meaningfulness of their encounter with the world because, for human
beings, the world of physical and social objectivity is always a world of
linguistic signifiability.  The human universe is part of, yet also different
from, the physical world in that it is composed of reflective selves whose
daily search for meaning is embedded in their linguistically mediated
relation to the world.
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These are three fundamental presuppositions underlying Mead’s theory of
the self.7 The question remains, however, how both the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ are
embedded in the self and to what extent they allow us to grasp the
complexity of selfhood.  It is the task of the following analysis to shed light
on the complexity of the self by exploring the various meanings of Mead’s
fundamental distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’.  When having a closer
look at Mead’s study of the self in terms of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’, it becomes
clear that, in his writings, these two concepts are given a variety of meanings
which are symptomatic not only of the complexity of the self but also of what
might be described as ‘the condition of human ambivalence’.  In essence,
what manifests itself in the condition of human ambivalence is the fact that
we, as entities capable of developing different identities, are caught up in a
permanent struggle between the ‘individual selves’ and the ‘social selves’
which inhabit our personalities.  Stating this problem is simple; grasping its
complexity could hardly be more difficult.
I. Individual and Society
The most obvious meaning of the Meadian distinction between the ‘I’ and
the ‘me’ is perhaps also the most essential source of existential ambivalence
in the formation of human selfhood: the relationship between individual and
society.  One fundamental – if not, the most fundamental – question in social
theory is the following: what is the relationship between individual and
society?  From the point of view of Mead’s symbolic interactionism, the
straightforward answer to this question is that, by definition, human selves
are both individual and social selves.  In other words, just as there are no
individuals without society, there is no society without individuals.  To the
extent that individuals depend on their immersion and participation in
society, society depends on the creation and reproduction of individuals.
Rather than conceiving of the relationship between individual and society
as an existential antinomy, we need to recognise that individual and society
stand both in an interdependent and in an interpenetrative relationship: they
are interdependent insofar as one cannot exist without the other, and they
are interpenetrative insofar as they cannot but permeate one another.  Thus,
not only do individual and society depend on each other, but they are also
impregnated with each other.  On the face of it, the individual represents the
inner reality of a single entity, and society designates the outer reality of a
collective entity.  Yet, the single entity called individual and the collective
entity called society cannot be divorced from one another, since the presence
of the former presupposes the presence of the latter, and vice versa. The
existence of individuals is inconceivable without the existence of society, just
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as the existence of society is unthinkable without the existence of individuals.
One of the main analytical advantages of the conceptual distinction between
the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ is that it permits us to account for the fact that both human
individuality and human society are located within the human self.
According to Mead, every human subject is composed of both the ‘I’ and the
‘me’, and the combination of these two core components of human
subjectivity is precisely what makes one a person: “Both aspects of the ‘I’
and ‘me’ are essential to the self in its full expression”8, that is, every self is
composed of an ‘I’ and a ‘me’, both of which can be regarded as two
competing yet complementary cornerstones of the human subject.
Mead’s ontology of the human subject is based on the assumption that “[t]he
separation of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ is not fictitious. [. . .] Taken together they
constitute a personality as it appears in social experience.”9 Given Mead’s
emphasis on the complementary coexistence of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’, his
conception of the self is founded on both a differentialist and a holistic view
of human nature.  On the one hand, Mead’s approach to the self is
differentialist insofar as he insists that the separation between the ‘I’ and the
‘me’ is real, rather than invented.  Hence, the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ exist as two
autonomous ontologies within every person.  On the other hand, Mead’s
account of the self is holistic insofar as he suggests that the unity of the ‘I’ and
the ‘me’ is genuine, rather than imagined.  Thus, the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ exist as
one conglomeratic ontology within every person.
What manifests itself in the paradoxical nature of Mead’s – simultaneously
differentialist and holistic – conception of the self is the paradoxical
constitution of the human subject: every self is equipped with the
idiosyncratic and innovative aspects of the ‘I’, whilst being shaped by the
collective and conservative aspects of the ‘me’.  Of course, just as our
subjective worlds cannot be dissociated from our social worlds, our social
worlds cannot be divorced from our subjective worlds.  To the extent that
our subjective worlds are pervaded by the ‘I’ and the ‘me’, our social worlds
are constructed by virtue of the ‘me’ and the ‘I’.  Society is a collective force
which resides in our individuality, and our individuality is a subjective force
which inhabits our society.
Although the ‘me’ and the ‘I’ fulfil complementary functions, the nature of
the former is fundamentally different from the nature of the latter.  Whereas
the ‘me’ is a direct product of the social communities to which we belong,
the ‘I’ embodies the irreducible components of our personality by which we
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distinguish ourselves from other members of our communities.  Put
differently, every self is at once an expression of individuality and an
expression of society: as an expression of individuality, it enables us to
convert ourselves into unique and distinctive members of a given community;
as an expression of society, it permits us to become integrated and assimilated
members of a given community.  Our individual identities, which we
develop as unique entities, reassert our need to create a sense of personality;
and our collective identities, which we develop as integrated entities,
reaffirm our need to generate a sense of commonality.  In short, Mead’s
distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ serves as a conceptual tool to account
for every person’s simultaneous immersion in individuality and society.
II. Freedom and Control
Another meaning of the distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ in Mead’s
writings is perhaps a less obvious, but certainly an equally significant, source
of existential ambivalence: the relationship between freedom and control.
From a Meadian perspective, there is no human freedom without the
creation of a personally developed ‘I’, and there is no social control without
the assimilation of a socially constructed ‘me’.  “The ‘I’ gives the sense of
freedom, of initiative”10, and of inventiveness.  The ‘me’, on the other hand,
equips us with a sense of control, of directive, and of normativeness.
Individual freedom is the expression of the ‘I’ over against the expression of
the ‘me’.  By contrast, “[s]ocial control is the expression of the ‘me’ over
against the expression of the ‘I’”11.  As soon as we enter the stage of being,
we are protagonists of a social process which is based on the interaction
between ourselves and others: we enjoy the freedom to be part of the world
as individuals, and we are exposed to the control exercised over us by our
consociates.  Human selves are caught up in the dialectical interplay between
freedom and control, self-determination and social determination, individual
autonomy and social constraints; in brief, we are trapped in the eternal
struggle between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’.
Given that freedom and control coexist in the human world, the productive
and executive side of human autonomy cannot be disentangled from the
regulative and grammatical side of human heteronomy.  The production and
execution of our actions is inconceivable without the regulation and
normalisation of our actions.  Every time we act, the world has already acted
upon us; and every time the world acts upon us, we have already acted upon
the world.  One central feature of the human being-in-the-world is the
relative determinacy which pervades our existential engagement in individual
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autonomy: only insofar as we are immersed in the social world are we capable
of going beyond the social world by affirming the idiosyncrasy of our
subjective world.  Yet, another significant feature of the human being-in-the-
world is the relative determinacy which permeates our existential exposure
to collective heteronomy: only insofar as we are immersed in our subjective
world are we capable of going beyond our subjective world by assimilating
the idiosyncrasy of the social world.
We are able to be what we want to be, but only to the extent that society
allows us to realise and exploit the potentiality of our individual
determinacy.  And we are prepared to be what society wants us to be, but
only to the extent that we allow society to exercise and enforce the
potentiality of its collective determinacy.  Grammars of freedom are always
permeated by grammars of control, just as grammars of control are always
pervaded by grammars of freedom.  The assumption that human existence
is shaped by the struggle between freedom and control is relatively
uncontroversial; the question of how human existence is shaped by this
struggle, however, could hardly be more controversial.
The strength of the Meadian conception of human existence is its capacity
to account for the subjective immediacy of the struggle between freedom
and control.  For the struggle between individual freedom and social control
takes place not only between human selves but also inside every human self.
The potential conflict between who we want to be and who we are expected
to be describes a source of existential ambiguity which is inscribed both in
our societies and in our subjectivities.  As a subjectively articulated
ambiguity of existential significance, the human struggle between freedom
and control is always located within the human self, that is, within every
ordinary subject equipped with an ‘I’ and a ‘me’.  To be sure, as relatively
autonomous beings, we have privileged access to our subjective world.
Nevertheless, although our subjective world escapes the parameters of direct
observational scrutiny and empirical measurement, it is always already
intruded by our external world.  In fact, the social world is by definition a
collective intruder of the subjective world, just as the subjective world is by
definition an individuative intruder of the social world.
The dialectic of freedom and control is embedded in the socio-constructive
locus of human existence: culture.12 Whether we live in a primitive or
complex, tight or loose, horizontally structured or vertically structured,
collectivist or individualist, relatively homogeneous or relatively
heterogeneous culture – any form of culture is necessarily based on the
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structural interplay between control and freedom.  Traditional and
collectivist societies tend to be control-based, whereas advanced and
individualist societies tend to be freedom-based.  Whatever type of society
we live in, we – as human actors – are equipped with both an ‘I’ and a ‘me’.
The more society succeeds in imposing its rules and regulations on the
individual, the more it succeeds in shaping the constitution of the self by
virtue of collective control.  The more society allows its members to act and
function according to their own needs and desires, the more it enables them
to shape the constitution of their selves by virtue of individual freedom.  In
the former scenario, the ‘me’ is the exogenously determined engine of the
self.  In the latter scenario, the ‘I’ is the endogenously determined architect
of the self.
In order to be effective, the preponderance of social control needs to be
reproduced by the predominance of the ‘me’, just as the preponderance of
individual freedom needs to be confirmed by the prevalence of the ‘I’.
Freedom and control, then, are not simply external matters of socially
negotiated regulations and expectations, but they are also internal matters
of individually developed schemes of action and habituation.  The
potentiality of freedom and control can only become a human reality insofar
as selves are impregnated with the generative complementarity of the ‘I’ and
the ‘me’, which carries the organisation of their coexistentiality right into the
condition of their subjectivity.  Put differently, the ‘me’ equips society with
relative control over its individuals, just as the ‘I’ endows the individual with
relative freedom from society.  Human selves cannot escape the existential
ambivalence caused by the struggle between freedom and control, but they
can convert the social determinacy of individual potentiality into the social
potentiality of individual determinacy.  If the existence of the ‘me’ permits
us to be thrown into the world as members of the world, the existence of the
‘I’ empowers us to throw ourselves back into the world as creators of the
world.
III. Transformation and Reproduction
In Mead’s writings, the distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ refers to
another key source of existential ambivalence: the relationship between
transformation and reproduction.  Every human self has both a transformative
and a reproductive side: the ‘I’ is the source of the subject’s power to shape
‘the’ natural, ‘our’ social, and ‘its’ subjective world; the ‘me’, by contrast, is
the vehicle of the subject’s capacity to be shaped by these worlds.  The far-
reaching significance of this matter can be summarised in two fundamental
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questions.  First, how do we explain the possibility of social order?  And,
second, how do we explain the possibility of social change?  A Meadian
answer to these two key questions relies upon the ‘me’ to account for the
possibility of social order and upon the ‘I’ to explain the possibility of social
change.  Whereas the existence of the ‘me’ allows for the social continuity of
our actions, the existence of the ‘I’ manifests itself in the individual
idiosyncrasy of our actions.  Insofar as our actions are normatively regulated,
they are motivated by the – individually internalised, yet socially constructed
– ‘me’.  Insofar as our actions can transgress already existing norms, they
can be driven by the – individually externalised, yet socially embedded – ‘I’.
From a Meadian point of view, there is no social order without the
reproductive power of the ‘me’, and there is no social change without the
transformative power of the ‘I’.
It is worth mentioning that both the ‘me’ and the ‘I’ are at the same time
immanent and transcendent forces of the social.  As an immanent force, the
‘me’ inhabits every socialised subject capable of reproducing the social order
in which it finds itself situated; as a transcendent force, the ‘me’ allows the
self to go beyond itself by immersing itself in intersubjectively negotiated
realms of sociality.  As an immanent force, the ‘I’ dwells in every individual
subject capable of transforming the social order in which it finds itself
situated; as a transcendent force, the ‘I’ enables the self to go beyond itself by
immersing itself in subjectively affirmed realms of individuality.
Thus, social change – conceived of in Meadian terms – is essentially due to
the transformative force of the ‘I’.  In Mead’s words, “[t]he ‘I’ is the response
of the individual to the attitude of the community [. . .].  His response to that
organized attitude in turn changes it”13.  The social is never for ever.  By
definition, every social order is potentially subject to social change, because
the reproductive power of every ‘me’ is potentially exposed to the
transformative power of the ‘I’.  Due to the reproductive force of the ‘me’,
selves are capable of absorbing their environments: every interaction with
our social environment is an action upon human subjectivity.  Due to the
transformative force of the ‘I’, selves are capable of changing their
environments: every reaction to our social environment is an action upon
human objectivity.  As Mead remarks, “the individual is constantly reacting
to the social attitudes, and changing in this co-operative process the very
community to which he belongs”14.  It is in the various processes of
assimilation of the individual, within the situation in which the ‘me’ finds
itself, that social order falls into place; and it is “in such reactions of the
individual, [. . .] over against the situation in which the ‘I’ finds itself, that
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important social changes take place”15.  Hence, rather than deriving the
possibility of social order and social change from structural forces that are
external to the human self, we can locate the possibility of social order and
social change in the reproductive power of the ‘me’ and the transformative
power of the ‘I’, both of which are internal to the human self.
IV. Unpredictability and Predictability
The Meadian distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ allows us to shed light
on a further source of existential ambivalence: the relationship between
unpredictability and predictability.  Human life is characterised by yet another
paradox: the actions undertaken by human beings can be both relatively
unpredictable and relatively predictable.  In other words, while some of our
actions are unforeseeable and irregular, others are foreseeable and regular.
We are performative entities whose practices can either deviate from or
coincide with the norms and expectations which are constantly thrown at us
by society.  In any case, our actions are embedded in socially negotiated
patterns of behavioural normativity.  If the possibility of social change is due
to the relatively unpredictable nature of social action motivated by the ‘I’,
the possibility of social order is rooted in the relatively predictable nature of
social action guaranteed by the ‘me’.
Both the unpredictability and the predictability of our actions are
considerable species-constitutive accomplishments: the fact that we can
never entirely foresee the actions of other human subjects means that every
social encounter can be a coexistential journey into largely insecure territory,
and the fact that we can often – consciously or unconsciously – foresee the
actions of other human subjects means that every social encounter can be a
coexistential ritual on fairly secure territory.  Human existence is always
situated between the unpredictable and the predictable nature of social
actions: the course of human history is a product of performative sociality.
The interplay between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ enables us to make history by
constructing and reconstructing sociality.  The construction of humanity is
a permanent process of social reconstruction.  To the extent that we, as
human beings, are condemned to move within spaces of social
reconstructability, we are doomed to confront the performative ambivalence
of our actions, which are always located between the individuative power
of purposive agency and the collective power of coordinative determinacy.
Following Mead, the relatively unpredictable nature of human action
emanates from the existence of the ‘I’, whereas the relatively predictable
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nature of human action stems from the existence of the ‘me’.  Given that “the
‘I’ is something that is never entirely calculable”16, the interactions which
take place in society are never completely predictable.  Given that “the ‘me’
is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes”17, the
interactions which take place in society are relatively predictable.  The fact
that the development of human societies is at the same time relatively
unpredictable and relatively predictable cannot be dissociated from the fact
that human beings are both individual and societal beings who seek to come
to terms with the existential contingency of their inner worlds by constantly
oscillating between the – endogenously determined – heterodoxy of their ‘I’
and the – exogenously determined – orthodoxy of their ‘me’.
One central question in social and political theory is why it is so difficult to
control human behaviour by virtue of systemic – for example, economic or
administrative – forms of power.  Put differently, a key phenomenon that
haunts social and political theorists is the performative elasticity of human
agency, which seems to transcend the systemic rationality of societal
structurality: it is far from clear to what extent it is possible to impose
steering mechanisms on society which allow for the calculable control of
social development through the use of systemic power.  This problem can
be summarised in the following question: why is it so difficult to control
human action ‘from above’ through systemic action?  From a Meadian
perspective, an answer to this question can be found in the sociological
power of the relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’: it is the unpredictable
force of the ‘I’ which can always potentially challenge the predictable force
of the ‘me’.  The most powerful steering media of society can never annihilate
the decision-making capacity of the individual.  No matter how deeply
ingrained social rules and norms may be in the predictable force of the ‘me’,
they do not possess the power to eliminate the unpredictable force of the ‘I’.
The human house of being is constructed upon the coexistential cornerstones
of the ‘me’ and the ‘I’: the former permits us to dwell in the house of being
as collective – and, hence, relatively predictable – entities; the latter, by
contrast, allows us to inhabit the house of being as individuative – and, thus,
relatively unpredictable – entities.  What we can never entirely predict,
therefore, is the predictability of the social; what we can certainly predict,
however, is its unpredictability.
V. Future and Past
Another, rather complex, implication of Mead’s distinction between the ‘I’
and the ‘me’ has to do with the historical nature of the human being-in-the-
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world: the relationship between future and past.  Human activity is
unavoidably embedded in and conditioned by worldly temporality.  Just as
social practices are spatially determined because they take place in
collectively constructed realms of human territoriality, they are temporally
determined because they are situated in relationally created spheres of
human historicity.  As the German word Geschichte suggests, history is
essentially a cumulative conglomerate of temporally interconnected layers.
The ‘me’ enables us to absorb and internalise the historical layers
accumulated by our social environment; conversely, the ‘I’ induces us not
only to act and work upon the layers that have been transmitted to us from
the past, but also to invent and externalise new historical layers that can be
generated by us in the present to create a future.
The existence of the ‘me’ illustrates the fact that we are always already thrown
into the world.  The existence of the ‘I’, on the other hand, corroborates the
fact that we are always still to throw ourselves back into the world.  Our
immersion in the past can challenge, but never do away with, our orientation
towards the future.  In fact, our ‘being-here-in-the-present’ would be
pointless without our capacity to mediate between the ‘has-been-there-in-
the-past’ and the ‘will-be-there-in-the-future’.  The interpenetrative power
of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ lies at the heart of our situatedness in the present, the
immersive power of the ‘me’ permits us to cope with our embeddedness in
the past, and the projective power of the ‘I’ allows us to face up to our
placedness in the future.
“That movement into the future is the step, so to speak, of the ego, of the ‘I’.
It is something that is not given in the ‘me’.”18 The future-oriented nature of
the ‘I’, as opposed to the past-laden nature of the ‘me’, reveals the
significance of historical openness for the constitution of human existence
on four levels.  First, historical openness is a constitutive element of the human
being-in-the-world.  From a Meadian point of view, the categorical openness
of human society is mainly due to the existence of our future-oriented ‘I’,
which is inherent in every ordinary subject capable of speech and interaction.
Second, historical openness is a deep-seated need of the human being-in-the-
world.  According to Mead, the existence of the ‘I’ is indicative of the fact
that subjects have a deep-rooted need to project themselves into the future.
We have to be able to look forward to the world in order to look forward to
life.  The reality of the human today is impregnated with the potentiality of
the human tomorrow.  Third, historical openness is an inevitable feature of
the human being-in-the-world.  Following Mead, every human practice is
an act towards the future.  Even when we wish to restore the past or maintain
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the present, we are always already oriented towards the future.  Just as the
‘I’ is an inherent feature of the human self, the future is an intrinsic element
of the human social: every time the ‘I’ responds to the ‘me’, the future inserts
itself into the presence of the past.  Fourth, historical openness is an
empowering facet of the human being-in-the-world.  The future can always go
beyond the present because, put in Meadian terms, the ‘I’ is capable of
bypassing – and sometimes even transforming – the ‘me’.  Human selves are
able to go beyond society because they are equipped with the capacity to go
beyond themselves.  Our orientation towards the future is a source of
existential empowerment, allowing us to invent human reality over and over
again.  Since all human selves are doomed to engage in the coexistential
exercise of articulating themselves by virtue of the ‘me’ and the ‘I’, they carry
both the past and the future within the presence of their existence.
VI. Self-Realisation and Self-Alienation
The distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ reveals another major source of
ambivalence in human life: the relationship between self-realisation and self-
alienation.  As entities capable of self-realisation, we can exploit our capacity
to cultivate the ‘I’, which inhabits our subjectivity.  As entities capable of self-
alienation, we can be colonised by the ‘me’, which is dictated to us by our
society.  Thus, the autonomy of the ‘I’, whose ego-affirming power allows
for human self-realisation, can be undermined by the heteronomy of the
‘me’, whose ego-colonising power can lead to human self-alienation.  Our
need for self-realisation is not a fiction but a reality: only insofar as we find
ourselves self-realised as human beings are we able to experience the
worthiness of human life.  Life seems worth living not only because the
world seems worth relating to but also because we are capable of inventing
our relationship to the world as entities with an inner drive towards self-
realisation.  
Self-realised subjects are actors able to recognise themselves in and identify
themselves with their actions.  Self-alienated subjects are actors compelled
to place themselves outside and distance themselves from their actions.  The
dictatorship of the ‘me’ can easily lead to complete self-alienation when there
does not seem to be any room for self-realisation.  Analogously, the
dictatorship of the ‘I’ can easily produce the illusion of complete self-
realisation when there does not seem to be any room for self-alienation.  The
struggle over the humanisation of humanity has always been, and will
always remain, a struggle for and against self-realisation and self-alienation.
The challenge consists in creating an equilibrium in which neither the former
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dominates the latter nor the latter dominates the former.  The ego-affirming
power of the ‘I’ and the ego-colonising power of the ‘me’ coexist in the
universe of human selfhood.  Our need for individuality and our need for
sociality force us to accept our need for humanity.
From a Meadian perspective, we seek to realise ourselves by realising the
potentials inherent in our ‘I’.  Insofar as we succeed in realising the potentials
inherent in our ‘I’, we draw on our capacity to go beyond the constraints
imposed upon us by society and embodied in the ‘me’.  In the light of the
liberating function of the ‘I’, Mead is willing to attribute not only significant
power but also an emancipatory mission to the ‘I’.  The Meadian emphasis
on the – distinctively human – need for self-realisation is based on a firm
belief in the transcendental function and ordinary reality of the ‘I’: “It is that
‘I’ which we may be said to be continually trying to realize, and to realize
through the actual conduct itself.”19 Within the Meadian framework of social
analysis, self-realisation is conceived of as a human practice.  In other words,
we realise ourselves only insofar as our daily activities constitute invaluable
sources of autonomy and creativity.  From a pragmatist point of view, we
need to focus on concrete human practices, rather than on abstract human
capacities, if we aim to demonstrate that the emancipatory potentials of our
existence are always already part of our daily activities, rather than of
transcendental imperatives.
VII. Self-Assertion and Self-Adaptation
The distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ points to another source of
existential ambivalence: the relationship between self-assertion and self-
adaptation.  As entities whose inner worlds are impregnated with the
individuative force of the ‘I’, we have a deep-seated need to assert ourselves
before others as expressive subjects who are unique members of a given
community.  As entities whose inner worlds are permeated by the collective
force of the ‘me’, we have a deep-rooted need to adapt ourselves to others
as assimilative subjects who are integrated members of a given community.
Only if we are able to assert ourselves before others as unique members of a
given community are we capable of developing a sense of personality which
allows us to situate ourselves in the world as irreplaceable entities whose
existence confirms the particularity of individuality.  And only if we are able
to adapt ourselves to others as integrated members of a given community are
we capable of developing a sense of solidarity which permits us to situate
ourselves in the world as replaceable entities whose existence reinforces the
generality of society.  Social selves, in the Meadian sense, can only exist as
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assertive and adaptive entities, for only insofar as we assert ourselves before
others, as indistinguishable beings, can we develop a sense of individuality
and only insofar as we adapt ourselves to others, as adjustable beings, can
we develop a sense of sociality.
The daily rhythm of our lives always depends on our capacity to establish
equilibrium between our need for self-assertion and our need for self-
adaptation.  The most assertive individual is nothing if not integrated into
society, and the most adaptable individual is nothing if not distinguished
from society.  Just as we seek to be recognised as meaning-producing entities
with an individual sense of identity, we aim to be recognised as meaning-
fusing entities with a collective sense of identity.  The development of an
individual sense of identity depends upon our capacity for self-assertion,
and the creation of a collective sense of identity is contingent upon our
capacity for self-adaptation.  The rhythm of our everyday life is marked by
the percussive power of the ‘me’ and the repercussive power of the ‘I’.
Whatever is thrown at us by society in order to make us conform to what is
always already constructed can be thrown back by us at society in order to
make us reform what is always still to be reconstructed.
The reconstructive power of society is inextricably linked to the
reconstructive power of consciousness.  Consciousness is never simply a
private matter but always a thoroughgoingly social affair.20 Indeed,
consciousness enables us to go back and forth between ourselves and other
selves.  We are eternal commuters between who we are as inhabitants of our
individuality and who we become as inhabitants of our society.  Every time
we assert ourselves before others we seem to be what we are without ever
having become who we are, and every time we adapt ourselves to others we
seem to become what we are without ever being who we are.  The dialectical
interplay between the authentic and the performative aspects of our
existence describes a social process based on a constant going-back-and-forth
between ourselves and others.  No human being can possibly escape from
the reciprocal processes of social interaction.  For the authenticity of our
individuality has no currency without our performative encounter with
others, just as the performance of our individuality has no currency without
our authentic encounter with ourselves.  The self-assertion of the ‘I’ equips
us with the capacity to develop a sense of authentic integrity, whose existence
we can only undermine if we deny ourselves the privilege of affirming
ourselves as carriers of individual identities.  The self-adaptation of the ‘me’
gives us the opportunity to develop a sense of performative integrity, whose
existence we can only undermine if we deprive ourselves of the ability to
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take on collective identities.
“It is this recognition of the individual as a self in the process of using his
self-consciousness which gives him the attitude of self-assertion or the
attitude of devotion to the community.  He has become, then, a definite
self.”21 In order to engage in social life we are obliged to engage in a
permanent process of negotiation between what and how we want to be and
what and how we are expected to be.  The assertion of our individual will
cannot be divorced from our devotion to the societal will, since the former
is necessarily shaped and constrained by the latter.  To be sure, philosophical
accounts of the self can differ fundamentally from sociological accounts of the
self: the former – for example, in a Kantian or Cartesian fashion – tend to
emphasise the power of self-assertion, derived from individual consciousness
and transcendental rationality; the latter – for instance, in a Marxian or
Durkheimian fashion – tend to stress the power of self-adaptation, expressed
in collective consciousness and social solidarity.  “There is a new social whole
[. . .] because of the self with its own assertion of itself or its own
identification with the community.”22 To the extent that the self asserts itself
before others as a unique member of its community, it contributes to the
variegated nature of the social whole.  To the extent that the self adapts itself
to others as an integrated member of its community, it contributes to the
bonding nature of the social whole.  As individuative creatures, we seek to
distinguish ourselves from our social environment; as collective creatures,
we seek to be accepted by our social environment.  Fully-fledged defenders
of individuality need to be fully-fledged members of society in order to
become fully-born children of humanity.  “Let us assert ourselves before
others as individuals” and “let us adapt ourselves to others as consociates”
– these are two categorical imperatives that underlie Mead’s conception of
the human subject.
VIII. Individuality and Conformity
Mead’s distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ serves to explore yet another
pivotal source of quotidian ambivalence which permeates the nature of
human existence: the relationship between individuality and conformity.  The
analysis of this source of existential ambivalence is particularly important
as the critical study of the relationship between individuality and conformity
obliges us to examine the normative presuppositions that underpin Mead’s
conception of society.  As Mead puts it, “[t]he value of an ordered society is
essential to our existence, but there also has to be room for an expression of
the individual himself if there is to be a satisfactorily developed society”23.
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In other words, the possibility of social order is just as fundamental to the
healthy functioning of human coexistence as the possibility of individual
expression, which may or may not diverge from the normative canon of
society.  The stability of every social order depends on its capacity to tolerate
or deprecate, promote or repress, include or exclude different forms of
individuality.  As ‘me’-based entities, we have a need for social conformity
and coexistential stability; as ‘I’-driven entities, we have a need for self-
referential individuality and biographical volatility.
Far from embracing either an individualist or a collectivist model of society,
and far from suggesting that either a pluralist or a monist model of society
is capable of promoting the genuine empowerment of the human subject,
Mead insists upon the complexity of the social universe, reminding us of the
fact that in every human society there is a need for the expression of
singularity and individuality, on the one hand, and for the expression of
loyalty and conformity, on the other.24 To be more precise, both individuality
and conformity are central driving forces of the social: as individuative
beings, we contribute to the transformative diversity of society; and, as
conformative beings, we contribute to the reproductive stability of society.
Every society is composed of different cultural, political, and ideological
traditions; the challenge consists in articulating our need for individuality
and our need for conformity in such a way that the former and the latter do
not undermine but complement each other.  In fact, individuality and
conformity need to be cross-fertilised by society in order to contribute to
enhancing the overall well-being of humanity.
Nonetheless, the question remains how the ideal of a balanced society, in
which there is enough room for individuality and conformity to coexist in a
fruitful manner, can be measured against the reality of an unbalanced society,
in which there is a disproportionate emphasis either on individuality or on
conformity.  Put differently, the ideal of a society which is freedom-based
enough to allow for the cultivation of individuality and control-based
enough to allow for the consolidation of conformity clashes with the reality
of societies in which the prioritisation of individual freedom implies the
destabilisation of collective control or in which the prioritisation of collective
control requires the abolition of individual freedom.
When reflecting upon the historical transition from traditional to modern
society, Mead makes a case for the view that the emergence of modern
individualist societies is a historical opportunity which can, at least in
principle, contribute substantially to the progress of humanity.  Mead puts
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it as follows: 
[. . .] primitive human society offers much less scope for
individuality – for original, unique, or creative thinking and
behavior on the part of the individual self within it or belonging
to it – than does civilized human society; and indeed the evolution
of civilized human society has largely depended upon or resulted
from a progressive social liberation of the individual self [. . .].25
Not that a Meadian interpretation of human evolution compels us to be
uncritical of the damaging social and psychological effects of
individualistically structured forms of coexistence, but it certainly obliges
us to recognise the emancipatory potentials which are set free in societies
committed to the promotion and protection of individual freedom and
expression.  Again, from a Meadian point of view, the problematisation of
the interplay between individuality and conformity is a sociological dynamic
which takes place both outside and inside the subject: it is outside the subject
where the societal norms which determine the interplay between
individuality and conformity are negotiated; and it is inside the subject where
the rules of this interplay are articulated through the internal, and often
disconcerting, dialogue between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’.  Thus, a comprehensive
sociology of individuality and conformity cannot do without a critical
psychology of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’.
Just as the colonisation of the ‘I’ by the ‘me’ can lead to the creation of an
overly ‘me’-dependent – that is, oversocialised – personality, the colonisation
of individuality through the pressure of conformity can result in the
consolidation of an excessively control-based – that is, oversocialising –
society.  And just as the rejection of the ‘me’ by the ‘I’ can bring about the
formation of an overly ‘I’-centred – that is, overindividualised – personality,
the rejection of conformity through the celebration of individuality can
produce an exceedingly freedom-based – that is, overindividualising – society.
The existence of the ‘I’ suggests that we need a healthy dose of individuality,
the existence of the ‘me’ indicates that we need a healthy dose of conformity,
and the coexistence of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ reminds us of the fact that we
depend on a balanced dose of conformative individuality and individuative
conformity.  The potentialities of individuality and conformity manifest
themselves in the realities of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’.
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Conclusion
As demonstrated above, the analysis of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ is central to the
Meadian account of the self, not only because it is of crucial referential
relevance in Mead’s writings, but also – more importantly – because it obliges
us to confront the complexity of the existential ambivalence of human
selfhood.  If we acknowledge that every subject is internally divided between
an ‘I’ and a ‘me’, then we need to face up to the deep ambivalence of human
existence, which arises from the multifaceted interplay between individual
and society.  To suggest that the relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ can
be regarded as an expression of our existential ambivalence means to assume
that we develop a sense of selfhood through the constant interaction between
the individuative and the collective aspects of human life.  As subjects
capable of reflection, we can convert our existential ambivalence into an
object of contemplation; as subjects capable of action, we can transform our
existential ambivalence into the motor of our worldly situation.  Whether we
reflect or act upon the world, the world is ours if we accept that we are of
the world.
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Endnotes
1 See, for example, Mead (1967 [1934]: 173-178, 192-200, 209-213, and 273-281).  Here
we shall focus on Mead’s Mind, Self, and Society, in which the distinction between the
‘I’ and the ‘me’ has a number of different meanings.  It should be noted that Mead’s
distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ was heavily influenced by William James,
who put forward a dualistic conception of the self (see James, 1890).
2 See, for example: Baert (1998: 70); Crossley (1996: 55-56, 61, 78, 90, and 144-145);
Habermas (1992 [1988]: 171-173, 177-182, and 187-193); Silva (2007a: 49 and 53); and
Silva (2007b: 5-6, 43, 51-59, 62-65, and 82).
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3 See, for example: Baert (1998: 70); Habermas (1992 [1988]: 172, 179, and 187); and
Silva (2007b: 51-55).
4 See, for example: “It is the self as such that makes the distinctively human society
possible” (Mead, 1967 [1934]: 240).
5 See, for example: “The human being is social in a distinguishing fashion” (ibid.:
241).
6 See, for example: “Language does not simply symbolize a situation or object which
is already there in advance; it makes possible the existence or the appearance of that
situation or object, for it is a part of the mechanism whereby that situation or object
is created. [. . .] Out of language emerges the field of mind” (ibid.: 78 and 133).
7 Cf. Baert (1998: 68-69).
8 Mead (1967 [1934]: 199).
9 Ibid.: 178.
10 Ibid.: 177.
11 Ibid.: 210.
12 See Susen (2007: 214 and 287-292).  See also Triandis (1996: 408-409).
13 Mead (1967 [1934]: 196, italics added).
14 Ibid.: 199-200, italics added.
15 Ibid.: 217.
16 Ibid.: 178.
17 Ibid.: 175.
18 Ibid.: 177.
19 Ibid.: 203.
20 See, for example: “No individual has a mind which operates simply in itself, in
isolation from the social life-process in which it has arisen or out of which it has
emerged, and in which the pattern of organized social behavior has consequently
been basically impressed upon it” (ibid.: 222).
21 Ibid.: 193.
81
22 Ibid.: 192.
23 Ibid.: 221.
24 See Mead (1967 [1934]: 221-222).
25 Ibid.: 221.
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